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Predictions, pollification, and Pol Profs: the ‘Corbyn Problem’ beyond Corbyn 
Peter Allen and David S. Moon, University of Bath 
 
Forthcoming at The Political Quarterly, February 2020 
 
Abstract: It has been noted that UK political punditry has a ‘Corbyn problem’: an underlying 
hostility to the Corbyn project and its supporters. As the Corbyn era draws to a close, we take 
stock and argue that the Corbyn problem was never fully ‘about’ Corbyn. Instead, it was the 
outward manifestation of a conjunction of tendencies present in contemporary UK politics: 
the prominence of a relatively small group of ‘intensely involved’ individuals driving dominant 
political discourse; the inability of traditional purveyors of broadcast media coverage to adapt 
to contemporary political currents and an unwillingness to self-reflect on possible biases in 
their approach; and the ‘pollification’ of election campaign coverage, aided by mainstream 
political scientists stereotyped in the figure of the ‘Pol Prof’. Combined, these tendencies are 
hostile to left-wing political actors and movements. They will not disappear with Corbyn and 
may even intensify as their structural underpinnings strengthen further.  
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Jeremy Corbyn’s rise to the position of Leader of the Labour Party in 2015 prompted a hostile 
response from almost all elements of the political class, most notably from mainstream 
pundits drawn from the media, politics, and academia.i This group embodied what some 
dubbed the ‘Corbyn problem’: an ‘underlying generally dismissive attitude towards the 
political dynamics that his candidacy and subsequent leadership represented and have set in 
motion’.ii If these attitudes were hidden in plain sight in 2017, it is fair to say that they became 
fully visible in 2019 during an election campaign that saw the attacks on Corbyn and his 
Labour Party both spread beyond their traditional dispensers and intensify in strength. 
 
As the Corbyn era draws to a close, some reflection on the Corbyn problem is timely, as is 
asking the question of whether the ‘problem’ will outlive Corbyn himself? We argue that, at 
root, the Corbyn problem was never fully ‘about’ Corbyn, but is instead the outward 
manifestation of a conjunction of underlying tendencies present in contemporary UK politics: 
the prominence of a relatively small group of ‘intensely involved’ individuals who work in or 
around politics, the media, or in the policy and think-tank sphere who shape and drive 
dominant political discourse; the inability of traditional purveyors of broadcast media 
coverage to adapt to contemporary political currents and an unwillingness to self-reflect on 
possible biases in their approach; and the ‘pollification’ of election campaign coverage, 
supported in this focus by mainstream political scientists. This group, stereotyped in the 
figure of the ‘Pol Prof’, increasingly possess significant social power and the ability to shape 
mainstream political discourse.  
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We begin by sketching the changing nature of the Corbyn problem in 2019 – focusing on the 
treatment of both the Conservatives and Labour in media coverage – before examining the 
role of opinion polling and political science. In sum we argue that, in the end, the ‘Corbyn 
problem’ is a symptom of deeper tendencies among and within UK political institutions, 
political commentary, and academics working on UK politics, all of which look set to outlive 
Corbyn’s leadership of the Labour Party.  
 
Conservatives play politics on ‘easy mode’, Labour on ‘hard’ 
It is uncontroversial to make a case that the majority of the print media and journalists 
working within it have traditionally had an aversion to the Labour Party and 2019 offered no 
real surprises or change in this regard.iii Taking this negative newspaper coverage as familiar 
background noise, the discussion around the role of the media in the 2019 election campaign 
has instead focused on the role of broadcast media. This was evident in two phenomena 
recurrent throughout the campaign, often linked: first, the struggle of the BBC to maintain its 
usual face of ‘due impartiality in all output’ and second, the increasingly unorthodox and 
norm-stretching campaigning techniques and strategy of the Conservative party that 
frustrated traditional modes of reporting.  
 
On November 28th, Channel 4 hosted the first ever election campaign debate focused solely 
on the issue of climate change, attended by the leaders of Labour, the Liberal Democrats, 
SNP, Green Party, and Plaid Cymru. Boris Johnson apparently refused to take part and Channel 
4 instead placed a block of melting ice where he would have otherwise been standing. 
Outside, Secretary of State for the Environment, Michael Gove, and Boris Johnson’s father, 
Stanley Johnson, sought to gain entry to the debate proposing that Gove take Johnson 
(junior’s) place. The other party leaders refused this offer, something Gove claimed showed 
they ‘wouldn’t accept a Conservative voice’. In the wake of this, anonymous Conservative 
sources briefed that, if successful at the election, the new government would explore 
reviewing the terms of Channel 4’s broadcasting remit, something seen as a thinly-veiled 
threat by many commentators. This followed a Channel 4 interview eight days earlier, in 
which Gove had repeatedly called into question the political motives of interviewer Ciaran 
Jenkins, accusing him of ‘polemical journalism’ and ‘mounting a rigorous left-wing case’, 
stating ‘people know that’s what Channel 4 News and you do.’iv 
 
The other key incident that saw the Conservatives testing the boundaries established by the 
main broadcasters was Boris Johnson refusing to be interviewed by Andrew Neil (supposedly 
the toughest of the BBC political interviewers). This November 28th refusal came after Jeremy 
Corbyn had been interviewed by Neil and was reportedly promised by the BBC that all party 
leaders had already agreed to the same treatment. Johnson and the Conservatives instead 
proposed that he be interviewed by Andrew Marr on his Sunday show – presumably an easier 
touch in their eyes. Having initially refused this request, the BBC relented following a terrorist 
attack in London on November 29th, citing the national interest in hearing from the Prime 
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Minister under these circumstances. The Conservatives appeared to face no serious 
consequences as a result of these actions. 
 
Turning to Corbyn and Labour, much negative coverage rested on the analytical category of 
‘credibility’, as have post-mortems of the election result. Credibility, as used in this context, 
is invoked as a neutral conceptual frame that can be used to determine whether a given 
political demand is outside the realm of political possibility. Despite masquerading as a 
neutral term, the notion of ‘credibility’ bears a significant ideological burden. Credibility is not 
a concept like weight or height that, when measured, can be independently agreed upon by 
all observers. Rather, it is observer-dependent; that is, for any one person to say that 
something is politically credible or not depends on what they themselves deem to be 
politically possible. Indeed, the very purpose of political movements of various stripes is to 
argue for their own conception of what is credible – it is not difficult to imagine that many 
observers felt revolutionary events, for example, were not credible until, suddenly, they were. 
Consequently, chameleon-like, credibility is likely to take on the dominant characteristics of 
the environment in which it emerges. If that environment is overwhelmingly hostile to 
articulations of left-wing politics, those ideas will have a higher bar to clear to seem credible. 
 
Labour’s manifesto was a self-proclaimed ‘radical’ offer. This was covered by the print media 
in the expected way – it was ‘crazy’ and would ‘cripple family finances’ according to The Sun. 
The BBC, along with broadsheet newspapers, drew on the generally-accepted judgement of 
the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) whose spokesman claimed that Labour’s plans were 
‘simply not credible’.v Despite the IFS being roughly equally critical of the manifestos of both 
main parties, the three main television broadcasters covered the reaction to Labour 15 times 
in the two days after launching their manifesto compared to once for the Conservatives 
following theirs. This is arguably a material manifestation of Labour’s credibility deficit, with 
Labour’s proposals receiving significantly greater scrutiny than the Conservatives’. A 
different, more serious, example of this regards the lamentable cases of racism in both main 
parties. On this issue, Labour again received significantly more scrutiny of ongoing issues of 
antisemitism in the party than similar incidences of racism in the Conservative Party. 
 
A wider tendency of media coverage was to fall into what might be dubbed a ‘false 
equivalency trap’ – casting two distinct political events as being somehow ‘the same’ and in 
doing so eliding critical differences between them. Emily Maitlis, presenter of BBC Newsnight, 
tweeted ‘We may come to dub this “the Election of 2 billion trees and 50 thousand nurses” 
- where numbers and accountability became meaningless. That’s a scary legacy’. Labour’s 
tree-planting policy was, however, in line with the recommendations of expert bodies 
including the Committee on Climate Change and the Woodland Trustvi, while Boris Johnson’s 
claim regarding ‘50,000 more nurses’ was admitted even by him to be untrue.vii In a similar 
vein, Observer columnist Nick Cohen saw equivalence between the Conservatives’ threats 
to Channel 4 (described above) and the Labour Party having a WhatsApp group of friendly 
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journalists with whom briefings could be shared. Here, Cohen equates the government 
threatening a major broadcaster with the removal of their broadcasting licence with the 
standard practice of ‘briefing’, where politicians selectively share beneficial information 
with journalists, seeing both as ‘corruption’. Yet another example of this was Laura 
Kuenssberg, political editor of BBC News, comparing Jeremy Corbyn’s stumbling response to 
the question of whether he watched the Queen’s Christmas message (‘some of the time’) to 
Boris Johnson repeatedly claiming that there would be no customs checks on goods entering 
Britain from Northern Ireland under his Brexit deal – the latter claim is untrue and contradicts 
the testimony of Johnson’s own Brexit Secretary. Kuenssberg, viewing these incidents, wrote 
‘Brass neck's been one of central features of this campaign - Johnson on checks…or Corbyn 
on watching the Queen’, again suggesting equivalence, despite it being questionable whether 
the latter issue is newsworthy at all.viii 
 
Predictably, it has since become the fashion to make statements to the effect that ‘it is a 
shame that so little attention was paid to how the governing party campaigned compared to 
the attention placed on Labour’, with political journalists gaining kudos for making banal 
pronouncements along these lines following the election.ix Many doing so invoke a spectral 
‘we’ when assigning responsibility for this task, obscuring the reality that they are the group 
with the power and profile to hold leading politicians to account and, when given the 
opportunity, failed to do so adequately. 
 
Why did these incidents end up stumping the broadcasters and apparently having few if any 
negative consequences for the Conservatives? One possibility is that the style of political 
coverage adopted by the main broadcasters, and the BBC in particular, is premised on the 
major political parties agreeing to engage with each other, the media, and the political system 
itself within the boundaries of some set of agreed rules, norms, and practices. These may 
include agreement not to call into question the political motives of an interviewer, to 
generally not misrepresent certain kinds of facts, and essentially to operate in a way that 
would not call into question – or do harm to – the foundations of the British political system 
itself. On top of this, however, are what now look like a series of lazy assumptions on the part 
of key actors – especially the BBC – that the Conservatives would do what they said they 
would and maintain commitments to participate in broadcast activities. This error is not ‘bias’ 
in the sense that a decision was made by an individual at the BBC to let Boris Johnson off the 
hook in avoiding being interviewed by Neil, but rather reflective of an underlying ‘old sport’ 
attitude rooted in a belief that the Conservatives would play fair; a form of ‘chumocracy’. 
 
This misunderstanding of bias was visible in defences of the BBC’s conduct during the 
campaign that were put forward by a number of senior BBC figures, including Huw Edwards 
who wrote that ‘These critics imagine a world in which thousands of BBC journalists…work to 
a specific political agenda 'dictated' by 'a few powerful individuals'’.x Defining bias in this way 
confuses what might be called agentic bias – individuals deciding to do X because it favours 
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or harms Y – with a more structural bias that, by no wilful fault of any specific individual, will 
favour certain kinds of political causes over others based on wider arrangements of power 
and influence in society. Imagine the reaction of the media had Jeremy Corbyn refused to be 
interviewed by Andrew Neil. Imagine that rather than attend the Channel 4 debate on climate 
change, Corbyn had sent his father and Richard Burgon. The point, of course, is that you can’t 
– Labour have to clear a higher bar to be considered credible, meaning they lack the ability to 
freewheel and go off-piste that the Conservatives not only enjoy, but are granted by the 
approach of the media. In contrast, Corbyn and Labour are variously criticised for not 
watching a Christmas address from the Queen, for engaging in the practice of sharing 
information with journalists, or for outlining a tree-planting policy that sounded unlikely at 
first glance. If the Conservatives play politics on easy mode, when led by a leader from the 
left of the party, Labour play on hard. 
 
Pol Profs, pollification, and exclusion 
The 2019 campaign once again saw opinion polling dominate the online and broadcast 
discussion among what might be called the ‘intensely politically involved’ – individuals 
working in politics and those cottage industries that comment on it, including political 
journalism and the academic discipline of political science. The campaign saw an 
intensification of the dissemination of opinion polls via social media, the overwhelming 
majority of which showed the Labour Party to be trailing the Conservatives. A small number 
of Labour supporters saw in this one-way polling traffic a conspiracy of sorts that they felt 
was in place to undermine the confidence of those campaigning for a Corbyn-led 
government after polling day. Such complaints most notably coalesced around the Twitter 
hashtag ‘#YouGov’, referring to the high-profile opinion-polling company. This prompted a 
response from members of the intensely involved that was almost mocking – for example, 
Matt Singh, an opinion pollster, described them as ‘tinfoil hat conspiracies’ and Kieran 
Pedley of IpsosMORI saw them as ‘a bit gaga’.xi Some pollsters, and indeed some academics 
residing in close social proximity to them, used these fringe complaints as sustenance for a 
narrative that they were continuing with this kind of work in the face of (non-existent) 
oppression, all while coverage of the latest polls dominated the national media. The easy 
downplaying of such extreme criticisms of opinion polling’s role in the election campaign 
effectively gave purveyors of this kind of horserace coverage a free pass by allowing them 
to sidestep less hysterical but perhaps more challenging critiques of what an excess of 
opinion polling can do to political debate in the lead up to an election. 
 
Rather than offer the already-socially powerful and politically savvy a chance to mock those 
they see as ‘cranks’ or similar, the #YouGov incident, along with a wider sense of discomfort 
with a polling-dominated social media bubble of those who make the political weather, 
should be seen as an indictment of the dominance of this form of political analysis. 
Specifically, it raises urgent questions about the desirability, sustainability, and fairness of 
a form of political debate that excludes most people lacking the educational and cultural 
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credentials that are required to participate. The ‘pollification’ of political discussion and 
coverage shifts the conversation away from political things that people can discuss without 
expertise in sampling and statistics (expertise concentrated among those who have had 
access to quite specific forms of higher education) and onto a playing field that is largely 
inaccessible and incomprehensible to many. As Twitter increasingly establishes itself as the 
platform of choice for political discussion among the intensely politically involved, members 
of the public who wish to join the discussion will likely seek to do this on Twitter. Right now, 
though, to seek to join is to do so on the terms of the most socially powerful players on the 
platform. If those terms lean heavily on discussions of opinion polling, to attempt to join is, 
to an extent, to be forced to participate in discussions of opinion polling. 
 
This was compounded by the way that polling data was released into the public sphere; 
polling companies, academics, and journalists eagerly advertised the release of polls in 
advance, often dropping oblique hints as to their content in the days before, with tension 
rising until results were unveiled. Inevitably, when the desired outcome was achieved – an 
over-excited reception by the public, a storm of retweets, a headline or mention in a 
newspaper – the very same individuals who had generated this fever pitch would then be 
at pains to point out that this was ‘just one poll’ and therefore not to be taken too seriously. 
The tediousness of this double move comes just a close second to its deleterious effect on 
political discourse and the phenomenon arguably saw its apex with the frenzy surrounding 
the release of YouGov’s first MRP poll on November 27th.1  
 
The response of pollsters to any criticism of the dominance of this form of political coverage 
suggests some complacency; again, Matt Singh: ‘Asking the public what they think and then 
using that to understand how people might vote, is not bias. It’s polling. It’s psephology’.xii 
Such a dismissal is largely ignorant to how differential social power works and to how the 
intensely politically involved (including pollsters, journalists, and academics) have the 
power to shape how politics is discussed in terms of both what is discussed and how these 
discussions play out – a power that an overwhelming majority of the population do not 
possess. To suggest that pollsters are simply doing their job by tweeting daily about the 
latest riders and runners is to miss the point – if starting over from fresh, would we design 
democratic discourse to be shaped around the desires and interests of opinion pollsters and 
other individuals with an unusually high level of interest in formal institutional politics or, 
instead, the experiences of the majority of people in their day-to-day lives?  
 
As was the case in 2017, a subset of British political science played a key role in the unfolding 
of the above, with particular weight placed on the ability of prominent members of the 
 
1 MRP stands for multilevel regression and post-stratification, ‘a technique for estimating public opinion in 
small areas using large national samples’,   Hanretty, C. (2019). An Introduction to Multilevel Regression and 
Post-Stratification for Estimating Constituency Opinion. Political Studies Review. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929919864773, p.1. 
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discipline to predict electoral outcomes. Predictions here take on a role akin to prospecting, 
Twitter the boundless cyber-territory on which this takes place, the hope of the speculator 
being that they will strike lucky and reap the subsequent reward of having ‘called it’. After 
the election results were public knowledge, many of these individuals took to Twitter to 
remind other users that they had correctly predicted the eventual outcome. These 
comments made little or no reference to the substance of the election outcome in political 
terms, particularly for those at the sharp end of policy proposals that are now likely to 
transpire, and often appeared to take some pleasure in telling those who had campaigned 
for the losing Labour party that their efforts had failed and that they were, simply, wrong. 
This seems a hollow way of viewing the political world. While it is, of course, fun to predict 
what will happen to things – football teams, soap opera characters, and so on - when the 
object of prediction is the society we live in and the only moral weight placed on each 
outcome is how close it is to what you guessed, parading in such triumph while mocking those 
invested in the losing campaign is unedifying at best, outright toxic at worst.  
 
Some have defended the role of psephology – the study and forecasting of elections – in the 
2019 campaign on the basis of accuracy, arguing that the sub-discipline performed well in the 
sense that it broadly ‘called’ the election outcome. This is worth commenting on; as with the 
case of pollsters above, ‘getting it right’ serves to give psephology a pass, the glow of having 
successfully forecasted the outcome precluding any serious questioning of the purpose and 
value of such activities. Again, it is important to consider power and influence – if 
psephologists were making these projections largely for their own entertainment, that would 
be one thing, but the reality is that their predictions carry weight and enter into a broader 
discussion around the likely outcome of the election. Aside from possibly offering a small 
number of voters more information on which to base their tactical vote choice (something 
most national vote intention polls cannot do at the constituency level), it is hard to see exactly 
what this plethora of forecasting and polling offers most people and, given the manner in 
which it dominates discussion of the election, it is conversely relatively easy to make the case 
that it is a distraction from more substantive policy issues. Rather than defending the status 
quo that sees polling dominate election coverage during campaigns, a more interesting 
question to ask is what a democratic case in favour of polling during campaigns would actually 
consist of? Although we agree that having some impression of the thoughts of fellow citizens 
on certain issues of the day may aid democratic accountability, it is less clear that this applies 
in the fast-moving environment of a campaign where the majority of polls focus on vote 
intention. 
 
As has been noted elsewhere, many political scientists have shown suspicion towards the left-
wing politics Corbyn’s Labour has represented in recent years. Reacting to this, some Twitter 
users have developed the meme of the ‘Pol Prof’, this itself generated from the usernames of 
prominent professorial colleagues who utilise the platform as well as the popular parody 
account based on stereotypes of this group, @ProfBritPol_PhD. The case made by many left-
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wing users of Twitter against the ‘Pol Profs’ is that they tend to launder what are broadly 
centrist or centre-right political views through quantitative data that is subsequently 
presented as non-ideological. The Pol Profs are typecast as residing in an online universe of 
‘sensible’ political commentary that is supportive of a brand of centrist politics similar to that 
advocated by Tony Blair in the 1990s, nowadays voiced by political columnists like John 
Rentoul and Andrew Rawnsley. Along these lines, the Pol Profs regularly produce ‘takes’ on 
political events that are broadly favourable to the status quo of political institutions and 
policies and bemoan the inability of those on the left to accept that their ideas are beyond 
credibility. 
 
The Pol Prof phenomenon is perhaps an extreme manifestation of a broader tendency shared 
among the intensely politically involved. This is that in addition to being professionally 
associated with the formal political world – participating in it, studying it, commenting on it – 
this same group are likely to also be fans of politics in some sense. To put it another way, 
there is a slippage between this professional involvement and a personal, leisurely 
involvement. Indeed, this was illustrated particularly clearly when, during the UCU strikes of 
2018 and 2019, even striking political scientists continued to post political commentary on 
Twitter on a daily basis, the line between work and play seemingly blurry for many. Here, we 
invoke Jonathan Dean’s notion of politicised fandom, which he theorises as applying to the 
relationship between some politicians and their ‘fans’ (such as Ed Miliband’s ‘Milifandom’).xiii 
We would argue that a version of this fan relationship exists at something like the level of the 
system for members of the intensely involved: it is almost the case that they are fans of 
themselves inasmuch as they are fans of the political universe that they not only continually 
reproduce but also inhabit – a Westminster-focused 24-hour merry-go-round of news and 
comment populated by a series of familiar faces, including their own.  
 
This tendency crystallises in certain forms of media (notably Twitter, but also broadcast 
magazine-style shows, radio content, or podcasts) where politics is discussed in the same style 
and format as professional sport – surface light-heartedness underpinned by deep reverence. 
For example, former Labour special adviser and now-comedian Matt Forde hosts a podcast 
(‘The Political Party’) that sits at this intersection of banter and seriousness. Members of the 
intensely politically involved are invited to share anecdotes from their political or journalistic 
careers, often tales about power and the powerful that are told in a jovial manner. These 
discussions are characterised by an easy bipartisanship, with the idea that politics is actually 
about conflict replaced by a warm and fuzzy notion that the real kinship in the political world 
comes from the fraternity of those so intensely involved in it, this opposed to partisan or 
other forms of kinship rooted in opposition to another on the basis of ideology. 
 
For this group, politics is akin to a television show that they enjoy consuming – they have 
favourite characters, plot arcs, catchphrases – but also have a significant hand in writing each 
day through their commentary and output on all forms of media. They are both consumer 
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and creator. The Corbyn problem can be viewed through this prism as the intensely involved 
losing control of the plot and thus no longer being able to enjoy the show as the story went 
in a direction they didn’t care for. This attitude is clear in comments made by John Rentoul 
who, after the election, wrote: ‘It is back to boring normal politics now. Tedious things such 
as a government with a standard majority in the House of Commons trying to do difficult 
things like get better results out of the NHS, schools and police’.xiv Their favoured writers are 
back; normal service can resume. 
 
Returning to the role of political science in the above developments, what is the diagnosis? 
There is the potential for a long answer in the disciplinary history tradition, but we will resist 
that for now. Instead, there are a small number of contemporary currents in both academia 
and the society in which it sits that offer some purchase on the question of how we, as a 
discipline, got here. Broadly, academic research as a whole has been forced by necessity into 
an institutional turn towards ever-increasing ‘relevance’, with significant onus placed by 
successive governments on what academia can offer both them, in policy development and 
implementation terms, but more often what it can offer businesses and industry. The political 
science variant of this is most prominently the way that the discipline is increasingly used by 
politicians, policymakers, and journalists as justification for the choices they make in terms of 
policy, electoral approach, or broadcast direction. Becoming a justifier, in this regard, is a clear 
‘pathway to impact’, potentially allowing the political scientist in question to claim on behalf 
of their institution that they have had some influence on public or political discourse. 
Concomitantly, Twitter has seen individual academics enter the business of curating an 
individual brand on social media, this extending well beyond the dissemination of their 
published academic works and into the realm of commentary on various ongoing political and 
cultural events and sometimes even their personal lives. The combination of these currents – 
the pursuit of ‘relevance’ and an ability to cultivate a personal brand – sees individuals 
formulating the latter in such a way as to maximise the likely success of the former. Of course, 
doing so means ensuring that the ‘brand’ does not imperil one’s relationships with other 
members of the intensely involved – for example, not challenging the assumptions underlying 
both the form and content of what powerful people do and withholding public judgement as 
to the consequences of the actual decisions they make. In this context, it is little wonder that 
large amounts of political commentary from the political science community has come to 
focus on the question of ‘who will win?’ rather than ‘what will (or, indeed, should) X do if they 
win?’ as answers to the latter hold the potential to stray too close to controversy. A further 
consequence is that much of the ‘public’ engagement being undertaken in these instances is 
rarely directed at the public. If anything, it is public engagement above the public’s heads, 
with the public serving as witnesses to the engagement between fellow members of the 
intensely involved rather than being participants in it. 
 
Corbyn was never the problem 
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The initial skirmishes of the Labour leadership contest have made it clear that the next leader 
is likely to receive similarly negative treatment to Corbyn – this will differ depending on who 
they are (Rebecca Long-Bailey’s Irish heritage or Keir Starmer’s owning an AGA cooker two 
possible variations on the theme), but it will persist nonetheless. We would argue that the 
mainstream political media, and many political scientists, are guilty of possessing a general 
lack of curiosity about left-wing politics, something that leads to the proliferation of incorrect 
or vacuous statements regarding the internal politics of the Labour Party and other 
movements further to the left. As with the mirage of the pool of water appearing to the 
parched desert traveller, the promise of any actual left-wing politics being seen as credible to 
many of the intensely politically involved will be forever out of reach, always just beyond the 
horizon. This, however, is unlikely to stop many (including some of the leadership contenders) 
from running towards it. 
 
But what of the deeper strains we identified above? One trend that seems to emerge from 
our account relates to the group of the intensely politically involved. Not necessarily 
politicians or even working for an explicitly political organisation, this group drive and shape 
the dominant manner in which politics is discussed in the UK on a daily basis. In this group, 
we see an interesting variation on Stuart Hall’s notion of political commitment: ‘a giving of 
the whole self to politics’.xv In one sense, the intensely involved clearly are giving their lives 
to politics, ceaselessly discussing it and, presumably, thinking about it. For many, it will also 
pay the bills. But on the other hand this giving, this commitment, is apolitical – it is not a 
commitment to an ideology or some idea of what could be, nor even a commitment to a 
specific set of political institutions. Rather, it is a commitment to politics as a series of events 
and people associated with what is happening at some site of political power (usually 
Westminster) on a given day. And because there is no commitment to anything except 
discussing and witnessing what is, this commitment becomes a tacit endorsement of politics 
as the mere management of the present. The implications of this for UK politics are 
simultaneously not fully developed and yet obvious all the same – broadly speaking, a 
favouring of those politicians or movements who appear content to play along with a politics 
without politics at the expense of hostility to those who do not. 
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